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Abstract The challenge for solo entrepreneurs to
add their first employee is arguably the single biggest
growth event facing any growing firm. To understand
how this event affects performance, and the ante-
cedents of hiring, we analyse Danish matched
employer–employee data. Those who hire enjoy
superior sales outcomes in subsequent years, while
the dispersion in profits increases. Furthermore, those
that hire enjoy faster sales growth in the previous year,
suggesting that sales growth precedes the first hire.
Finally, we show that founders with a stronger profile
in terms of education and previous income are more
likely to increase profits, while the characteristics of
the employee are less important. The latter finding is
important from a job creation perspective, in light of
the suggested sorting of more marginalized employees
into new and established firms.
Keywords Solo entrepreneurs  Recruitment  Firm
growth  Post-entry growth  Scale-up  Employment
growth  Sales growth  Founders  New firm growth
Mark Nickel, founder of Sampler Publications,
did everything himself for a year. Then he hired
the sister of a friend who lived across the street.
Her husband had just left her, and she needed to
support her kids. His second employee was ‘‘a
suicidal alcoholic neighbor. I thought I’d rehabil-
itate her. When she sobered up, I’d let her come
over and type names.’’ The third employee was a
friend of the second employee. Bhide (2000: 87)
1 Introduction
The first hire constitutes the single biggest growth event
facing any growing firm—it effectively corresponds to
the challenge to solo entrepreneurs to double their
workforce. A recent article entitled ‘‘Can you afford an
employee’’ from the Danish magazine ‘‘The
Supporting data are available to bona fide researchers, subject
to registration, from Statistics Denmark, at www.dst.dk/en.
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Entrepreneur’’ estimates that the total cost of the first
employee is 135 %of thewage paid because of expenses
related to payroll system, additional equipment, insur-
ance, social security contributions, additional adminis-
tration cost, etc., without even taking into account the
opportunity cost of the entrepreneur training the first
employee (Sand and Paaske 2010). However, these costs
and challenges decrease with additional employees
hired. Continuing in the Danish context, only around
one-third of the new ventures registered in 2013 had
employees. In addition, if all 153,364 firms without
employees in 2013 took on one additional employee, this
would solve the unemployment problem (153,110
individuals were registered as full-time unemployed in
2013). Although this statement is rather simplistic as not
all unemployed are employable and there may be
insufficient demand for firms’ output, it remains that
self-employed individuals have considerable job-creat-
ing potential. Also, once they overcome the hurdle of
recruitment and selection, subsequent growth will be
easier, and they will develop a taste for further growth
(Delmar and Wiklund 2008). Besides performance
effects, empirical research has also identified well-being
effects for entrepreneurs associated with recruitment, as
the life satisfaction of self-employed with employees is
found to be higher than those who are self-employed
without employees (Blanchflower 2004). Nevertheless,
solo entrepreneurs who seek to take on their first
employee also face great uncertainty as well as the
daunting prospect of trusting someone else with their
‘‘baby’’ (Gartner 1997). Furthermore, it is possible that
solo entrepreneurs underestimate the relative abilities of
candidate employees, by overestimating their own (a
phenomenon known as ‘‘illusory superiority’’),1 and for
that reason, decide not to hire. Even if they are willing to
make their first recruitment, capital restriction, inexpe-
rience in hiring and the uncertainty of the future of the
venture could make it impossible to attract qualified
employees.
Given the challenges of the first recruitment, this
paper focusses on this first hire, i.e. the microfounda-
tions of firm growth. Arguably, the first hire epito-
mizes the distinction between the entrepreneurial and
the non-entrepreneurial business. Although we are not
the first to investigate the hiring of the first employee
(see Carroll et al. 2000; Burke et al. 2000, 2002;
Cowling et al. 2004; Henley 2005; Andersson and
Wadensjo 2007; Mathur 2010; Congregado et al.
2010; Millan et al. 2013), we contribute to the
literature in a number of ways. First, we move beyond
the institutional factors that promote the hire decision
of entrepreneurs, i.e. low taxes (Carroll et al. 2000),
lower health insurance (Mathur 2010) and lower
employment protection legislation (Millan et al.
2013), as well as previous work on the overall new
venture performance (Congregado et al. 2010), by
identifying a range of characteristics of the hiring
entrepreneur. In this dimension, we add to the existing
contributions that have investigated how personal
characteristics of the entrepreneur affect their ability
to create jobs, e.g. previous labour market status
(Andersson and Wadensjo 2007) and experience
(Cowling et al. 2004), gender (Burke et al. 2001),
entrepreneurship ability (Burke et al. 2000, 2001) and
(financial) assets (Burke et al. 2000; Henley 2005).
Contrary to these studies, this investigation not only
looks at the characteristics of the entrepreneur and the
subsequent hiring decision, but also how this hiring
decision affects the performance of the new venture.
Furthermore, this study also looks more carefully at
the characteristics of the first recruit; despite anecdotal
evidence, as illustrated by the opening quote, there is
no large sample empirical evidence regarding who
gets hired and how these hires differ from other
workers transitioning into employment.
Thus, specific research questions we would like to
address are: what are the performance antecedents and
consequences of making the first hire? Which
entrepreneurs will hire, and which employees will be
1 Theoretical work in social psychology has identified the
phenomenon of ‘‘illusory superiority’’, which proposes that
individuals display systematic cognitive biases in the sense of
being overconfident about their abilities when comparing
themselves with others (Camerer and Lovallo 1999). One
classic example is a nationwide survey of high school students,
where 85 % reported they were above the average in ability to
get along with others [College Board 1976–1977, cited in Krizan
and Suls (2008)]. The social psychology literature has provided
plenty of empirical support for illusory superiority (e.g. Hoorens
1993). The flip-side of this cognitive bias is that individuals may
wrongly consider the abilities of others to be lower than average.
This makes them underestimate the gains to hiring a new
employee. Although the benefits of hiring of a first employee
may be systematically underestimated, our results may help to
correct for this systematic cognitive bias, if we can demonstrate
that those solo self-employed that take on their first employee
Footnote 1 continued
enjoy favourable outcomes, compared to a suitable control
group who remain solo self-employed.
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hired? Our research focus is therefore simultaneously
narrow and broad: narrow in that it focuses specifically
on the first hire made by solo self-employed
entrepreneurs 2 years after entry, and broad because
it takes a number of approaches to shed light on
different facets of this first hire event. More specifi-
cally, we look at the change in new venture perfor-
mance when adding an employee by investigating
growth in sales and profits.
By using a detailed, large-scale database to create a
valid comparison between ‘‘treatment’’ and ‘‘control’’
groups, we explore the evolution of the two groups
over time and investigate whether sales growth
precedes or lags behind employment growth. More-
over, we investigate not only what happens to the firms
that hire, but we also take into account the questions
‘‘who hires?’’ and ‘‘whom gets hired?’’ Indeed, if the
recruitment challenges of entrepreneurs hold, we
would expect to see entrepreneurs with more verifiable
human capital to be more likely to attract (qualified)
employees, and a selection of less qualified employees
into the new ventures compared to incumbent firms.
Our matching estimators show that those who hire
enjoy superior sales outcomes in subsequent years,
while the dispersion in profits increases. Analysis of
the evolution of sales growth around the time of the
first hire reveals that those entrepreneurs that hire
enjoy faster sales growth in the previous year,
suggesting that sales growth precedes the first hire.
This important finding suggests that not all solo
entrepreneurs should hire—only those with sufficient
sales growth to justify the workforce expansion. The
first employee then boosts sales growth in subsequent
years. Turning to the questions of ‘‘who hires?’’ and
‘‘whom gets hired?’’, regressions show that the
likelihood of recruiting the first employee increases
with education and opportunity-based start-up. More-
over, those that get hired in the new ventures
(compared to those hired by incumbents) are more
likely to be less educated and also unemployed (or
employed with a lower income) the year before being
hired. Finally, we show that founders with a stronger
profile in terms of education and previous income are
more likely to increase profits, while the characteris-
tics of the employee are less important. Together,
these findings emphasize the positive job-creating
function of entrepreneurs for society and the need to
address the possible barriers for the majority of solo
entrepreneurs of taking on their first employee, as well
as including an additional dimension to the debate
regarding which entrepreneurs to promote and support
through policy.
The next section describes the theory related to
hiring the first employee followed by the methodology
behind this quantitative study. The empirical results
are presented and discussed at the end with limitations
and policy implications.
2 Theory and hypotheses
The section derives hypotheses related to the questions
‘‘what happens when solo entrepreneurs hire?’’, ‘‘who
hires?’’ and ‘‘whom gets hired?’’ by reviewing the
literature concerning co-evolution of firm growth and
recruitment, the benefits of recruitment and the
challenges of recruitment.
2.1 Co-evolution of firm growth and recruitment
Firm growth is a multifaceted phenomenon, because
employment growth and sales growth are distinct (but co-
evolving) dimensions of growth that shed light on
different aspects of the growth process (Shepherd and
Wiklund 2009;Miller et al. 2013). However, after having
recognized that these two dimensions of growth are
distinct, the question then turns to whether one precedes
the other (Coad 2010; Achtenhagen et al. 2010). Which
comes first: sales growth or employment growth?
There are arguments for both causal directions. On
the one hand, hiring might lead to further sales growth
because of the simplistic logic that employment is an
input, while sales is an output (but this in itself doesn’t
stop sales from preceding employment), and also
because employment growth boosts sales through the
drawing up of subsequent growth projects (Penrose
1959 on large firms). Firms might thus decide to scale
up by hiring more employees to better pursue business
opportunities (Coad and Guenther 2014).
On the other hand, sales growth might engender a
subsequent increase in the workforce. In this view,
firms hire to respond to overwhelming demand and to
ease the strains on their overstretched workers. Indeed,
the empirical evidence points this way: Moneta et al.
(2013) analyse the growth processes of large US firms
and observe that sales growth comes first in the causal
ordering of growth variables, before employment
growth.
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In our present research context, we emphasize that
the first hire is an especially daunting growth event
that effectively corresponds to a sudden doubling of
the workforce. The first hire brings about many
challenges relating to work organization (e.g. recon-
figuration of tasks and redesigning of routines, issues
of monitoring and moral hazard, communication and
coordination), such that we expect that solo entrepre-
neurs will be risk-averse and reluctant to make their
first hire until they are overwhelmed with increases in
sales. Therefore, we suggest that:
H1 Entrepreneurs who make their first hire will have
higher sales growth in the preceding period than
entrepreneurs who do not hire.
2.2 Benefits of recruitment
There are strong arguments that hiring additional
employees provides access to additional resources and
enables scale increases. These factors allow entrepre-
neurs to better deal with environmental uncertainties
(Shane 2003; David and Watts 2008; Sarasvathy
2008), and they are critical to the success of new and
small businesses (Hornsby and Kuratko 1990; Desh-
pande and Golhar 1994; Cardon and Stevens 2004).2
Not being able to attract the necessary human
resources is also recognized to be detrimental to the
survival of the business (Katz et al. 2000; Leung et al.
2006), and it is also among the most cited threats to
business growth (Williamson et al. 2002; Lee 2014).
Empirical evidence confirms that new ventures with
more employees outperform other new ventures taking
into consideration a broad range of performance
indicators like survival, growth, profitability and
initial public offering (Shane 2003, p. 239; Coad
et al. 2014).
In addition, research shows that life satisfaction of
the self-employed is on average higher than the life
satisfaction of employees; nonetheless, the life satis-
faction of the self-employed with employees is even
higher (Blanchflower 2004, p. 54). Furthermore,
Tamvada (2010) observes that employing entrepre-
neurs have higher earnings (or more specifically,
consumption expenditures) than solo entrepreneurs.
More generally, entrepreneurs appear to benefit from
recruiting employees in terms of both new venture
performance and well-being. Despite the importance
and benefits of human resources, recruiting employees
is far from an easy task for entrepreneurs as recruit-
ment and selection are affected by a combination of
organizational attributes (including characteristics of
the entrepreneur), organizational legitimacy and
labour market characteristics. In particular, recruiting
qualified employees with the desired set of skills and
competences is a challenge (Williamson et al. 2002;
Aldrich and Ruef 2006).
2.3 Challenges in recruitment
Small-sample, case-based studies and surveys have
continuously demonstrated that recruitment and recruit-
ment selection practices differ substantially among
firms, predominantly the dimension of size (Deshpande
and Golhar 1994; Barber et al. 1999; Carroll et al. 1999)
but also when it comes to firm age (Cardon and Stevens
2004; Cardon and Tarique 2008). These differences
manifest themselves mainly on the use of more formal
processes of recruitment like relying on job postings and
the use of external recruitment agencies in larger well-
established firms compared to more informal, ad hoc
and idiosyncratic methods (e.g. relying on social
networks and recommendations of existing staff) in
small firms and youngorganizations (Carroll et al. 1999;
Aldrich and Ruef 2006; Barrett and Mayson 2008); this
is beautifully illustrated in the opening quote that
precedes our Introduction section. In essence, in their
efforts to recruit—or probably more accurately to
select3—a candidate, entrepreneurs face challenges
associated with their liability of smallness (Aldrich
andAuster 1986) and liability of newness (Stinchcombe
1965; Freeman et al. 1983). These two features of new
ventures, which are closely related to each other
although also distinct, will affect recruitment and
selection in different ways (Cardon and Stevens 2004).4
2 Earlier work on the recruitment and selection focused
predominantly on the practices of small firms rather than new
ventures per se.
3 Contrary to larger or more established firms, entrepreneurs
often do not have the luxury to select a candidate from a large
pool of applicants. Given its ad hoc nature, most entrepreneurs
will be confronted with only one candidate, if any, and the
subsequent decision to hire this one individual. This is probably
most common when recruiting the first employee.
4 In addition to organizational features that explain difficulties
in recruitment, other (institutional) obstacles might affect
entrepreneurs that are interested in making their first hire for
28 A. Coad et al.
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Liability of smallness can be associated with
organizational awareness and resource constraints.
Organizational awareness affects entrepreneurs in two
ways (Williamson et al. 2002). First, it affects them as
job seekers cannot be attracted to apply for a position
at a firm they are not familiar with, i.e. they lack
organizational familiarity. Second, even if the job
seeker is familiar with the organization it is more
difficult to acquire credible information about the
organization and the organization’s image. Resource
constraints will set limits to the ability of entrepre-
neurs to invest in a formal recruitment process to
identify (qualified) employees beyond the immediate
network, to advertise the new venture to counter the
above-mentioned organizational awareness, and the
ability to offer attractive wages and other employee
benefits (e.g. on the job training) to potential candi-
dates (Leung 2003; Aldrich and Ruef 2006). In
addition to lacking organizational awareness and
resource constraints, new ventures are confronted
with a relative unfamiliar environment and lack a track
record of performance (Cardon and Stevens 2004);
consequently, clearly defined organizational roles and
overall organizational legitimacy, which can be gath-
ered under the heading of liability of newness, have
not been established. Due to their inexperience with
hiring employees, these entrepreneurs cannot provide
this labour market signal; in addition, there are no
individuals that have filled this job position previously
compared to established firms in the industry (Aldrich
and Ruef 2006). So even if these new ventures are
known by the job seeker and do not suffer from
resource constraints as such, job seekers are not able to
assess whether the entrepreneur is a desirable or
attractive employer (Williamson et al. 2002).
2.3.1 Who hires?
Informal recruitment methods can alleviate some of
the problems of liability. First, by using direct and
indirect ties, the cost of recruitment and the following
monitoring of the worker decreases. In addition, the
informal nature of the search process provides better
opportunity for the entrepreneur to obtain knowledge
about the competencies of the potential employee, and
for the potential employee to obtain more organiza-
tional knowledge and more information on the role he
or she might play in the new venture, and an
assessment on whether the entrepreneur could poten-
tially be a good reliable employer (Aldrich and Ruef
2006). Thus, it may reduce uncertainty in the
employment relationship. This last factor is potentially
important, as the ability for an entrepreneur to attract
quality employees would, just as in any other form of
resource acquisition (Shane 2003), be dependent on
the quality of the entrepreneur. Higher-quality entre-
preneurs, or entrepreneurs that can signal high quality
(e.g. based on education and previous entrepreneurial
and work experience), are expected to attract better-
quality employees into the organization (Bublitz et al.
2015). The fact that a new venture survives the initial
phases also has a signalling value; consequently, as
demonstrated by Andersson and Wadensjo (2007),
‘‘the probability of having employees increases with
time spent in self-employment’’ (Andersson and
Wadensjo 2007, p. 616).
From this discussion, we derive the following
hypothesis:
H2 More qualified entrepreneurs can send stronger
signals to potential applicants and are more likely to
hire.
2.3.2 Whom gets hired?
In addition to answering the question who hires, it is
also relevant to discussing what characterizes the
candidates entrepreneurs hire. One has to consider that
the majority of potential employees are already
employed, and those that are not, or those who are
seeking new job opportunities, have the opportunity to
select among—or are directly approached by—a large
set of other (established) organizations that are able to
provide well-paid and well-defined job positions, in
particular if these individuals are highly qualified.
Thus, in the process of selecting employees, the
entrepreneur is exposed to asymmetric information,
adverse selection, moral hazard and uncertainty
(Shane 2003). Consequently, economists argue job
seekers that are attracted to work for new ventures
have generally limited outside options or are in other
ways marginalized on the labour market, e.g.
Footnote 4 continued
example national regulations such as employment protection
regulation (Millan et al. 2013) and health insurance regulations
(Mathur 2010). Given the one-country setting of this study, we
do not elaborate on this any further.
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unemployed, difficulties holding a steady job (Bhide
2000). Furthermore, given their similarity to small
organizations, one might follow the argument by
Atkinson and Storey (1994) who mentioned that:
[w]ages are lower, training is less frequent, and
the evidence for a compensating higher level of
job satisfaction is weak [contrary to entrepre-
neurs]. Furthermore, in view of the financial
weakness of many small businesses … and their
relatively low levels of unionisation, effective
job security for workers is likely to be lower than
for workers in large firms (p: 11, text in brackets
added).
It is therefore not surprising to observe that when
entrepreneurs are able to attract employees, these
employees are more likely to be part-time workers, to
be less educated, to receive lower wages and benefits,
to receive less training, to work longer hours, to be
more likely to get injured, to be younger and to have
lower job tenure (Parker 2004: p. 197).
Based on this discussion, we derive the following
hypothesis:
H3 Entrepreneurs hire workers that are less qualified
compared to workers hired in incumbent firms.
3 Method
3.1 Motivation for the chosen methodology
Interest from researchers and policymakers into the
job-creating process has led to a large literature on
firm-level employment creation and firm growth
(Birch 1979; Haltiwanger et al. 2013); some even
claim that growth is ‘‘the very essence of entrepreneur-
ship’’ (Sexton and Smilor 1997: p. 97). However,
despite the efforts, research into the determinants of
firm growth has been slow (McKelvie and Wiklund
2010), and our ability to predict which firms will grow
is hardly better than random (Geroski 2000; Coad et al.
2013; Denrell et al. 2015). Geroski (2000: p. 169)
summarizes the literature thus: ‘‘The most elementary
‘fact’ about corporate growth thrown up by econo-
metric work on both large and small firms is that firm
size follows a random walk’’.
Considering the difficulties in explaining how
much firms will grow, in this paper we take a different
approach, by focusing on a narrowly defined—yet
crucially important—growth event. Our novel
approach is inspired by some reflections from Nobel
Laureate Herbert Simon (1984: p. 40):
In the physical sciences, when errors of mea-
surement and other noise are found to be of the
same order of magnitude as the phenomena
under study, the response is not to try to squeeze
more information out of the data by statistical
means; it is instead to find techniques for
observing the phenomena at a higher level of
resolution.
We therefore focus on a narrowly defined growth
event instead of attempting to explain all growth
events faced by all firms—we focus on the first hire.
Although the usual mantra is that ‘‘the more observa-
tions the better’’, in some cases extra precision can be
gained in econometric estimates by discarding irrel-
evant observations that are poor matches.5 In our case,
we start with the population of Danish start-ups, but
then focus on a bounded sample to obtain clean
evidence on the first hire event. Even though we
discard most of our observations, we nevertheless
have a relatively large number of observations
remaining—corresponding to all relevant start-ups in
Denmark over the period 2001–2006. While having a
small number of observations is not a virtue per se, our
focus on a homogenous sample—as also suggested in
Sarasvathy (2004)—leads us to gain new insights by
looking at firm growth ‘‘under the microscope’’.
3.2 Data and empirical design
The data used for the main analysis are of a
longitudinal matched employer–employee register of
all individuals and firms in Denmark [e.g. used in
Nanda and Sørensen (2010), Dahl and Sorenson
(2012), Coad and Timmermans (2014) and Nielsen
(2015); see also Timmermans (2010)]. How this
register database differs from other registers is that it
is created in close collaboration with academic
researchers for the purpose of conducting labour
market research. We identify new ventures with only
5 This is referred to by Ho et al. (2007: 214) as the paradoxical
advantage of matching estimators that consists of reducing
variance by discarding data.
30 A. Coad et al.
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one registered founder in the period 2001–2006. The
main analysis is to compare the performance—growth
in sales and profits—of start-ups that hire an employee
compared to those that do not. More specifically, we
observe the solo self-employed start-ups at time t = 1,
ensure that they do not hire in t = 2 and then
distinguish between those that hire one employee in
t = 3 (2215 ‘‘treatment’’ firms) versus those that do
not hire an employee in t = 3 (31,082 ‘‘control’’
firms), resulting in a total sample of 33,297. We then
observe the performance outcomes of firms up to
t = 6. Figure 1 provides a summary representation of
our empirical set-up.
The reason why we ensure that founders do not hire
anyone at t = 2 is because we want to include new
ventures that have already reached some sort of
‘‘steady state’’ and are accustomed to operating as
stand-alone self-employed individuals, instead of
having their first hire in mind at the time of founding.6
While these data restrictions are strong, nonetheless
our narrow sampling strategy provides clean evidence
on the impact of the first employee compared to a
suitable control group (and moreover, our large-scale
national dataset means we have enough observations
for meaningful statistical analysis). The empirical
design in the different analyses investigating ‘‘what
happens happen when solo entrepreneurs hire?’’,
‘‘who hires?’’ and ‘‘whom gets hired?’’, respectively,
is outlined next.
Semi-parametric matching estimators and a care-
fully selected control group allay endogeneity con-
cerns in estimating the causal effect of the first
recruitment on subsequent firm performance. In anal-
ogy to the ‘‘twin studies’’ experimental design
(Boomsma et al. 2002), firms are matched at birth
(although the ‘‘twins’’ may randomly have different
experiences between birth and the treatment opportu-
nity) and we observe how an event in later years
(t = 3) impacts on their overall development. Match-
ing is based on initial sales, initial profits, gender, age,
immigrant status, marital status, education level (i.e. at
least a college degree), labour market status the year
before start-up (employed, unemployed, outside of the
labour force or under education), income in year
before start-up, household wealth in year before start-
up, parental entrepreneurship experience, industry
dummies and region dummies. In addition, these
personal matching variables are used as explanatory
variables in estimating the characteristics of those
entrepreneurs that hire an employee (2214 individuals
behind 2215 new firms) compared to those that do not
hire (30,513 individuals behind 31,082 new firms) in a
logit model. In the same way, the personal matching
variables are used to estimate the characteristics of
those that get hired in the 2215 new ventures compared
to a control group of 12,000 randomly selected
individuals that were hired in the same period (2000
Fig. 1 Entrepreneurs are
matched at start-up (‘‘twins’’
matched at birth), neither
hire at t = 2, and the
‘‘treatment’’ hires one
employee (only) at t = 3,
while the ‘‘control’’ hires no
one at t = 3.2215 firms are
in ‘‘treatment’’; 31,082 firms
are in ‘‘control’’
6 Problematic would be the case where an entrepreneur enters in
December of 1 year and makes the first hire in January of the
following year—we are not interested in such observations,
because it is likely that the entrepreneur had the first hire in mind
already at the time of founding.
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individuals from each of the years 2003 to 2008) in
established firms in the private sector founded before
1991, i.e. firms that are at least 10 years old; the
control group consists of 11,961 different individuals
hired in 5235 different firms. Finally, the personal
characteristics of the founders as well as the employ-
ees in the 2215 hiring firms are used as explanatory
variables in logit models with the top third (1) and
bottom third (0) percentile regarding profits 5 years
after start-up (3 years after hiring the first employee)
as dependent variable. Descriptive statistics on the
population containing the treatment and control group
can be seen in ‘‘Appendix’’ (Tables 6, 7, 8; see also
Table 9 for a correlation matrix).
Although our empirical set-up was designed to shed
light on the causal effects of sales growth and
employment growth around the time of the first hire,
nevertheless caution should be used before interpret-
ing our estimates as causal effects. There may be
unobserved differences between the treatment and
control groups at the time of birth, that cannot be
detected using observed variables (often referred to as
‘‘unconfoundedness’’ or ‘‘selection on observables’’,
see, for example, Imbens and Wooldridge 2009).7
Considering that the treatment is not externally
imposed, but that it is a choice made by the
entrepreneurs, there may remain self-selection bias
into the treatment/control groups, despite our best
efforts to control for differences using observed
variables as controls.
In addition to the matching analysis, we further
investigate the phenomenon of the first hire by
performing standard regressions to uncover the char-
acteristics of which entrepreneurs hire and which
individuals get hired, and business-level outcomes (in
terms of profits) that occur after the first hire. These are
presented in Sects. 4.2 and 4.3.
4 Analysis
We begin by describing the evolution of sales and
profits around the time of the first hire, using a
graphical analysis (using boxplots) as well as match-
ing estimators that focus on estimating the causal
effect of the first hire (Sect. 4.1). Later sections apply
multivariate regressions to address in more detail who
hires and who gets hired (Sect. 4.2) and the determi-
nants of post-hire profits (Sect. 4.3).
4.1 Matching estimates of the treatment effect
of the first hire
We begin by inspecting boxplots (see Fig. 2) of the
evolution of sales and profits for the solo founders that
hire their first employee (i.e. the treatment group)
compared to those who do not hire (i.e. the control
group). A first finding is that, in all years, there is
considerable heterogeneity between firms in terms of
their sales and profits. Furthermore, given the earlier
reported differences between those that hire family
members and those who do not, we have made some
boxplots where we removed the new ventures where
the founder recruited family. We see that sales is
higher in the treatment group even 1 year before their
first hire (i.e. even in t = 2), which suggests that these
firms enjoy sales growth before deciding to hire an
employee. Instead of new employees ‘‘earning their
keep’’ in terms of boosting sales once they arrive at
time t = 3, Fig. 2 (left) suggests that instead it is sales
growth that precedes employment growth.
Figure 2 (right) shows the evolution of profits in the
years after entry. ‘‘Treatment’’ firms start off with
slightly lower profits at time t = 1 and have similar
profits at t = 2, and at the time of the first hire onwards
(t = 3 onwards), treatment firms have slightly larger
median profits, but also more dispersion in the
distribution of their profits. The first hire, therefore,
does not always lead to higher profits, but in a few
cases could lead to profits being more strongly
negative.8
7 One such problematic omitted variable could be growth
aspirations at the time of birth. In this case, it could be the
anticipation of future sales growth that ‘‘causes’’ employment
growth, even if employment growth is observed before any
change in realized sales. However, given the prevalence of over-
optimism affecting entrepreneurs’ forecasts (Hayward et al.
2006), the difficulties in forecasting and the time lags used in our
empirical design (no one hires until the third year), we consider
this problem to be relatively minor.
8 Note, however, that if the profits variable is log-transformed,
as is frequently done for skewed distributions such as this, then
observations of negative profits will all be excluded from the
data sample by construction, thus introducing selection bias, and
making the profits variable appear to rise over time.
32 A. Coad et al.
123
Figure 3 in ‘‘Appendix’’ provides an alternative
representation of Fig. 2, when the variables sales and
profits are log-transformed. Taking logarithms has the
advantage of compressing the range, although it
requires that only positive values can be included in
the calculations, which is problematic for our profits
variable.
Turning to the main analysis of the study, we apply
propensity score matching.9 The matching estimates
in Table 1 reveal that those who hire an employee
enjoy superior outcomes (sales and profits) in the years
after the hire.
The first of the three panels in Table 1 corresponds
to log sales as the outcome variable.10 In the year of
founding (t = 1), there are no significant differences
between treatment and control. From t = 2 onwards,
however, the treatment group has larger sales than the
control group. The difference between the two
increases from t = 2 to t = 4 and, after reaching a
maximum, then decreases slightly over the period
t = 4 to t = 6. It is interesting to observe that those
that hire in t = 3 enjoy faster sales growth in the
previous year (t = 2), suggesting that sales growth
precedes the first hire. This novel and important finding
suggests that not all entrepreneurs can hire their first
employee—only those with sufficient sales growth to
justify the workforce expansion. The first employee
then boosts sales growth in subsequent years. This has
important implications for encouraging entrepreneurs
to hire their first employee—not all entrepreneurs
should do so, because sales growth seems to precede
employment growth in the causal ordering of firm
growth processes (Moneta et al. 2013).
The second of the three panels in Table 1 reports
ATT estimates for log(profits). These results mirror
those found for log(sales), because from t = 2 to t = 5
the treatment group enjoys higher profits than the
control group who do not hire, with the largest
difference occurring in the year of the first hire at
t = 3. The results show similar patterns when exclud-
ing those observations where the first hire is a family
member. Keeping in mind, however, that log-trans-
forming the profits variable introduces bias into our
estimates, all cases of negative profits are dropped.
Therefore, the third of the three panels in Table 1
corresponds to profits as the outcome variable. Here
we see that the treatment and control groups never
have a significant difference between them in any of
the years considered. Taken together, the second and
third panels of Table 1 highlight how firms that hire
can be shown to enjoy higher profits if the negative
cases are excluded, while when we include the full
sample there is no difference between those that hire
and those that don’t. The first hire is a double-edged
sword that can lead to higher profits or higher losses—
because it results in more dispersion in profits. Hence,
it is natural to ask whether the characteristics of who
hires and who gets hired as previously assessed are
important for the likelihood of success as measured by
post-hire profits—to this we now turn.
Fig. 2 Boxplots for the evolution of sales (left) and profits (right), for the 6 years since start-up, for treatment (1) and control (0)
9 We also sought to complement our results with multidimen-
sional nearest-neighbour matching (Abadie et al. 2004), but
problems with the computations meant that this estimator was
not able to yield any results.
10 Since sales takes non-negative values, we log-transform this
variable to normalize it and make it less heavily skewed.
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4.2 Regression analysis: who hires and who gets
hired
The marginal effects from logit models with hiring (1)
versus non-hiring (0) new ventures as dependent
variable are shown in Table 2; the marginal effects are
calculated with the remaining explanatory variables
set to the mean. Explanatory variables in Model 1 are
personal founder characteristics at the time of start-up.
Model 2 adds variables related to the year before start-
up (i.e. labour market status, income, household
wealth and entrepreneurship parents), while Model 3
looks at a larger subsample where we have excluded
founders that have recruited a family member. An
interesting finding is that, of those that hire, we
observe that 28 % recruit family members.We suspect
that different mechanisms are involved when recruit-
ing family, and we would like to control for this form
of recruitment. In Model 4 and Model 5, we run the
analysis on a subsample of firms in high-tech and
knowledge-intensive business services, because these
sectors often attract a large amount of attention, and
also because one might argue that these industries
have different labour demands in terms of higher
‘‘quality’’, higher skilled employees. All models
include region and industry controls (six and 19
dummies, respectively).
Models 1 and 2 show that the likelihood of hiring
the first employee is increased by age (at a diminishing
rate), education and wealth, although the latter two are
only significant on the 10 % level. Moreover, when
looking at labour market status the year before start-
up, founders enrolled in education are more likely to
hire (10 % level), while unemployed founders (1 %
level) and founders outside of the labour market (10 %
level) are less likely to hire. This supports the view that
education and start-up motivation (i.e. opportunity-
based and not necessity-based) are important for
attracting the first employee into the firm by signalling
personal ability and a promising opportunity. How-
ever, in Model 3, where we exclude the subsample of
funders that hire family members, we observe some
differences. First, the age effect becomes more visible
and non-Danish founders are less likely to hire,
indicating—interestingly—that if non-Danes hire they
are more likely to hire family members. The unem-
ployment variable is still significant, but the marginal
effect has decreased. Wealth and enrolment in college
Table 1 Matching
estimates
Average treatment effects
on the treated (ATT)
obtained from propensity
score matching (Leuven and
Sianesi 2003)
Matching covariates: initial
sales, initial profits, gender,
age, immigrant status
(dummy), marital status,
education level,
unemployment in years
before start-up, income in
year before start-up, wealth
in year before start-up,
parental entrepreneurship
experience, industry
dummies and region
dummies. Coefficients in
bold denote significance at
the 5 % level
Year Treated Controls Difference SE t stat.
Log(sales)
1 12.641 12.644 -0.003 0.033 -0.100
2 13.592 13.386 0.205 0.028 7.370
3 13.873 13.357 0.517 0.029 17.930
4 14.014 13.467 0.547 0.031 17.850
5 14.071 13.611 0.460 0.035 13.150
6 14.098 13.674 0.423 0.038 11.160
Log(profits)
1 11.194 11.179 0.015 0.034 0.450
2 12.010 11.890 0.120 0.032 3.750
3 12.137 11.833 0.304 0.035 8.810
4 12.170 11.964 0.206 0.036 5.650
5 12.155 12.041 0.114 0.042 2.690
6 12.193 12.109 0.085 0.046 1.830
Profits
1 128,891.952 142,223.165 -13,331.213 12,599.687 -1.060
2 264,008.212 229,775.713 34,232.499 19,894.703 1.720
3 254,375.192 241,264.205 13,110.987 26,691.120 0.490
4 242,793.009 266,923.332 -24,130.323 42,610.119 -0.570
5 266,652.446 225,247.461 41,404.985 31,119.019 1.330
6 232,213.383 261,474.048 -29,260.665 28,219.854 -1.040
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become insignificant, when controlling for family
members. In Model 4 and Model 5, we turn our
attention to new ventures founded in high-tech and
knowledge-intensive business services only, and the
twomodels show similar results.When looking only at
Model 5, where we removed those that hire family
members, we can observe that women and married
individuals are less likely to be hired, the age effect is
stronger (i.e. likelihood increases with age at a
diminishing rate) and higher educated founders are
more likely to hire (now significant at the 5 % level).
Turning to founder status before start-up, those
previously unemployed are again less likely to be
hired while, surprisingly, previous income has a
negative effect. An explanation of the latter could be
that those with a high income before start-up may
assess their competences superior to that of potential
recruits and for that reason, underestimate the gains to
Table 2 Who hires? Regression results (marginal effects) from logit models with hiring (1) versus non-hiring (0) as dependent
variable
Model 1 mfx Model 2 mfx Model 3 mfx Model 4 mfx Model 5 mfx
Female -0.001 -0.000 0.001 -0.017*** -0.009***
(0.003) (0.003) (0.002) (0.005) (0.004)
Age 0.002** 0.002** 0.004*** 0.006*** 0.006***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002)
Age2 -0.000*** -0.000*** -0.000*** -0.000*** -0.000***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Non-Danish 0.002 0.004 -0.014*** 0.002 0.007
(0.004) (0.004) (0.003) (0.012) (0.010)
Married 0.004* 0.003 -0.002 -0.002 -0.009**
(0.003) (0.003) (0.002) (0.006) (0.004)
College degree 0.007* 0.008* 0.006* 0.010* 0.010**
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.006) (0.004)
Unemployed -0.013*** -0.008*** -0.026*** -0.013***
(0.004) (0.003) (0.007) (0.005)
Outside labour force -0.009* -0.007* -0.012 -0.003
(0.005) (0.004) (0.011) (0.008)
Enrolled education 0.031* 0.018 0.057 0.035
(0.016) (0.012) (0.049) (0.034)
Previous income (ln) -0.000 -0.000 -0.002*** -0.001***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000)
Household wealth (ln) 0.001* 0.001 0.002* 0.001
(0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001)
Entrepreneurship parents -0.002 0.001 -0.002 0.002
(0.003) (0.002) (0.005) (0.004)
Log likelihood -7751.552 -7639.529 -5865.682 -1344.908 -947.660
Pseudo-R2 0.048 0.049 0.066 0.033 0.062
Observations 33,266 32,904 32,291 6971 6851
Industries All All All High-tech and KIBS High-tech and KIBS
Industry dummies (19) Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Region dummies (6) Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Includes family hires Yes Yes No Yes No
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p\ 0.001; ** p\ 0.01; * p\ 0.05; ? p\ 0.1
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hiring a new employee (this may be due to a genuine
skills gap or merely a perceived skills gap due to
‘‘illusory superiority’’).
The next question concerns which employees the
hiring solo entrepreneurs are able to attract to the
venture. Table 3 mirrors the models in Table 2 and
shows the regression results from logit models with, as
dependent variable, being hired in a new venture (1)
versus an established venture (0). Only now, the
explanatory variables are employee characteristics
instead of founder characteristics. Model 1 and Model
2 show that the likelihood of being recruited in a new
venture increases with age (at a diminishing rate) as
well as being higher for non-Danes, married and those
with entrepreneurial parents. In addition, individuals
without a college degree, and with previous low
income, are more likely to be hired in a new venture.
Finally, workers coming from unemployment or
outside of the labour force are more likely to find
employment in a new venture compared to an
established firm, while the opposite is found for
individuals enrolled in education before recruitment.
These effects, which can be considered as indicators
for individuals that are more marginalized on the
labour market, are in line with the theory (Bhide 2000;
Parker 2004). Moreover, the finding that individuals
with entrepreneurial parents are more likely to work in
new ventures could be explained by preference for this
type of occupation shaped by the environment in
which they were raised. However, Model 3 reveals
that this effect disappears when controlling for family
hires, suggesting that the children of entrepreneurs
being hired in the family firm drive the positive effect
in Model 2.
In addition, in Model 3 shows that non-Danish and
married workers are not more likely to work for new
ventures when excluding family hires, although the
negative and positive effects of a college degree and
unemployment, respectively, are still strong and
significant. Finally, wealthy individuals are less likely
to work for a new venture when excluding family
hires, and positive and negative effects of being
outside of the force and enrolled in education before
recruitment, respectively, are significant now only at
the 10 % level.
In Models 4 and 5, we direct our focus again to
firms in high-tech and knowledge-intensive business
services. The results mirror those found in the previous
models, although a few differences are worth
mentioning. First, females and individuals outside of
the labour force are more likely to work in new
ventures compared to established ventures when
family firms are included (Model 4), but not when
they are excluded (Model 5). Second, individuals
unemployed before recruitment are more likely to be
hired by new ventures compared to established as
found before, but the marginal effects are significantly
larger in high-tech and knowledge-intensive business
services both when including and excluding family
hires. Third, individuals with a college degree are
surprisingly not significantly less likely to find work in
new ventures compared to established firms as found
in the previous models including all industries.
Overall, based on these findings we can conclude
that established firms are more likely to hire employ-
ees with a stronger labour market profile, leaving the
more marginalized workers on the labour market to the
new firms that struggle to pay high wages and need to
convince potential employees of a promising future in
the new venture. However, this pattern appears to be
different when controlling for family recruitment or
focusing solely on high-tech and knowledge-intensive
business services. In general, high-income individuals
and individuals with a college degree are less likely to
be recruited in new ventures, while previously unem-
ployed individuals and non-Danes are more likely to
be hired in new ventures. When excluding family
recruitment, the effect on non-Danes disappears. The
effect of college degree disappears—and the effect of
unemployment is amplified—in high-tech and knowl-
edge-intensive business services. The effects of pre-
vious income and unemployment are significant in all
models.
4.3 Regression analysis: post-hire profits
An important research question surrounding the
phenomenon of the first hire concerns whether hiring
entrepreneurs enjoy superior business-level perfor-
mance. To investigate this, we run logit regressions to
see if the first hire improves business-level perfor-
mance, while controlling for other possible confound-
ing influences.
The three logit models in Tables 4 and 5 mirror the
first three models in Table 1, except for the dependent
variable measuring whether the hiring new venture is
in the top third, or ‘‘tercile’’ (1), or bottom tercile (0),
regarding profits 5 years after start-up (3 years after
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hiring). Table 4 includes founder characteristics,
while Table 5 includes employee characteristics.
Table 4 reveals that high post-hire profits are
associated with founders with a college degree and
founders that had a relatively high income in the year
prior to founding. Overall, not only is a strong founder
profile important for attracting the first employee, but
it is also important for the subsequent chance of high
profits. This could be due to more talented founders
being able to attract better employees, which is
supported by Dahl and Klepper (2016) and Bublitz
et al. (2015). In addition, male founders are more
likely to enjoy high post-hire profits.
Interestingly, when looking at employee character-
istics in Table 5, these are largely unable to explain the
performance of the new venture, besides a positive
effect of previous income when including family hires
(Model 2) and a positive effect of having a college
degree when excluding family hires (Model 3). Thus,
the employee characteristics as such seem not to be of
vital importance for the performance of the new
venture after hiring. This makes sense, considering
Table 3 Who gets hired? Regression results (marginal effects) from logit models with being hired in a new venture (1) versus an
established venture (0) as dependent variable
Model 1 mfx Model 2 mfx Model 3 mfx Model 4 mfx Model 5 mfx
Female 0.011* 0.009 -0.005 0.048*** -0.002
(0.006) (0.006) (0.005) (0.017) (0.014)
Age 0.009*** 0.010*** 0.009*** 0.012*** 0.013***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.005) (0.004)
Age2 -0.000*** -0.000*** -0.000*** -0.000** -0.000***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Non-Danish 0.089*** 0.070*** 0.014 0.040 0.041
(0.012) (0.012) (0.010) (0.037) (0.035)
Married 0.013* 0.017** -0.008 0.041* -0.020
(0.007) (0.007) (0.006) (0.022) (0.017)
College degree -0.011 -0.021** -0.019*** -0.016 -0.017
(0.008) (0.008) (0.007) (0.020) (0.016)
Unemployed 0.025** 0.022** 0.085** 0.075**
(0.010) (0.009) (0.040) (0.037)
Outside labour force 0.038*** 0.017* 0.126** 0.053
(0.012) (0.010) (0.051) (0.043)
Enrolled education -0.025** -0.016* 0.021 0.023
(0.010) (0.009) (0.042) (0.036)
Previous income (ln) -0.005*** -0.003*** -0.009*** -0.005**
(0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002)
Household wealth (ln) -0.001 -0.002** 0.001 -0.002
(0.001) (0.001) (0.004) (0.003)
Entrepreneurship parents 0.013** 0.003 0.008 0.010
(0.006) (0.005) (0.019) (0.016)
Log likelihood -5102.258 -4903.166 -3872.154 -762.027 -571.074
Pseudo-R2 0.091 0.104 0.100 0.112 0.099
Observations 13,927 13,555 12,999 1849 1732
Industries All All All High-tech and KIBS High-tech and KIBS
Industry dummies (19) Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Region dummies (6) Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p\ 0.001; ** p\ 0.01; * p\ 0.05; ? p\ 0.1
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that the employee (who may simply follow the
founder’s instructions) has less influence on strategy
(and hence performance) than the founder. Moreover,
the benefits of new firms for job creation are under-
valued at a societal level, given the need to employ
workers that cannot find employment in large estab-
lished firms.
5 Discussion
The first hire may well be the most daunting and
difficult growth event that a firm will ever undertake.
Although previous research has investigated factors
that explain which institutional-level (Carroll et al.
2000; Mathur 2010; Millan et al. 2013) and entrepre-
neur-level (Burke et al. 2000, 2001; Cowling et al.
2004; Henley 2005; Andersson and Wadensjo 2007;
Congregado et al. 2010) characteristics turn solo
entrepreneurs into employers, we contribute by inves-
tigating the effect of hiring on new venture perfor-
mance and also include a detailed analysis of who gets
hired, besides anecdotal evidence that points to a
necessity-based approach of entrepreneurship
employment, i.e. individuals that are marginalized
on the labour market. In this paper, we analyse a rich
and unique dataset on Danish new ventures to provide
clean evidence on the circumstances surrounding the
Table 4 Regression results
(marginal effects)—who
hires and subsequent
performance (top tercile of
treatment, in terms of
profits, versus bottom
tercile of treatment)
Robust standard errors in
parentheses
*** p\ 0.001;
** p\ 0.01; * p\ 0.05,
? p\ 0.1
Model 1 mfx Model 2 mfx Model 3 mfx
Female -0.131*** -0.126*** -0.147**
(0.046) (0.048) (0.060)
Age 0.015 0.016 0.018
(0.012) (0.013) (0.019)
Age2 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Non-Danish -0.038 -0.033 0.001
(0.061) (0.066) (0.106)
Married -0.029 -0.026 -0.012
(0.037) (0.038) (0.046)
College degree 0.103* 0.095* 0.160**
(0.055) (0.057) (0.070)
Unemployed -0.003 0.035
(0.080) (0.091)
Outside labour force 0.097 0.091
(0.098) (0.130)
Enrolled education 0.103 -0.069
(0.161) (0.219)
Previous income (ln) 0.015*** 0.014***
(0.004) (0.005)
Household wealth (ln) -0.003 -0.002
(0.008) (0.009)
Entrepreneurship parents -0.032 -0.013
(0.037) (0.042)
Log likelihood -655.914 -640.868 -446.241
Pseudo-R2 0.036 0.047 0.049
Observations 982 970 677
Industries All All All
Industry dummies (19) Yes Yes Yes
Region dummies (6) Yes Yes Yes
Includes family hires Yes Yes No
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first hire. Entrepreneurs that hire 2 years after found-
ing were observed to enjoy superior sales in the
previous year, suggesting that sales growth precedes
the first hire. Regression analysis of the first hire event
highlighted the expected selection of variables when
looking at the personal characteristics of founders that
hire and employees that get hired. More educated
founders with employment before founding the ven-
ture—making necessity start-up less likely—are more
likely to hire the first employee, which is in line with
previous research on hiring decisions of entrepreneurs
(Burke et al. 2000, 2001; Cowling et al. 2004). Those
that get hired could be characterized as being more
marginalized on the labour market (compared to those
that get hired in established firms), lining up on the
expectations put forward by Bhide (2000) and Parker
(2004). That is, they are less educated and having been
unemployed or employed with a low income before
being hired. Solo entrepreneurs that take on their first
employee experience higher sales growth, while the
dispersion in profits increases. As expected, stronger
founders are more likely to achieve high profits, while
the employee characteristics are less important. This
has important policy implications, as eliminating the
barriers for hiring the first employee benefits not only
the entrepreneur, but also society, because individuals
hired may have a marginal status on labour markets.
Moreover, these findings add to the discussion
Table 5 Regression results
(marginal effects)—who
gets hired and subsequent
performance (top tercile of
treatment, in terms of
profits, versus bottom
tercile of treatment)
Robust standard errors in
parentheses
*** p\ 0.001;
** p\ 0.01; * p\ 0.05;
? p\ 0.1
Model 1 mfx Model 2 mfx Model 3 mfx
Female 0.012 0.022 0.024
(0.038) (0.039) (0.048)
Age -0.003 -0.007 0.001
(0.007) (0.008) (0.010)
Age2 -0.000 0.000 -0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Non-Danish -0.073 -0.058 -0.049
(0.055) (0.060) (0.084)
Married -0.019 -0.030 0.003
(0.040) (0.043) (0.051)
College degree 0.062 0.064 0.149**
(0.056) (0.062) (0.076)
Unemployed 0.054 0.005
(0.055) (0.067)
Outside labour force -0.008 -0.119
(0.067) (0.087)
Enrolled education -0.020 -0.005
(0.090) (0.106)
Previous income (ln) 0.011** 0.007
(0.005) (0.006)
Household wealth (ln) 0.004 0.001
(0.006) (0.006)
Entrepreneurship parents -0.053 -0.050
(0.038) (0.045)
Log likelihood -659.360 -637.282 -444.568
Pseudo-R2 0.031 0.040 0.038
Observations 982 958 667
Industries All All All
Industry dummies (19) Yes Yes Yes
Region dummies (6) Yes Yes Yes
Includes family hires Yes Yes No
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regarding whether policy should focus on promoting
new venture creation in general, or target certain
individuals with a strong entrepreneurial profile.
Our analysis is not without limitations. First, the
Danish context should be taken into account. Although
there are many similarities between the labour market
in Denmark and other developed countries such as the
USA (see, for example, Bingley and Westergaard-
Nielsen (2003) who write that the Danish and US
labour markets are about equally fluid), the unem-
ployment benefits are more generous than in many
other developed countries, which could result in fewer
necessity-based entrepreneurs and marginalized
employees. Nevertheless, the start-up rate in Denmark
is not significantly different than in advanced
economies with other levels of unemployment benefits
and the survival rate of new firms in Denmark—where
about one half are closed within the first 3 years—is
similar to findings in other advanced economies (e.g.
Coad et al. 2013; Anyadike-Danes and Hart 2014).
Second, we have no information on the relationship
between the founder and the first employee (e.g. from
the social network) or information on informal help in
the new firm from friends and family. This could be an
important issue, however. Research in social psychol-
ogy has shown that individuals show self-related
biases when the comparison other is a vague case such
as ‘‘most others’’ or ‘‘the average other’’, but self-
related biases are attenuated or removed when the
other is a familiar person such as a best same-sex
friend or a sibling (Hoorens 1993, p. 122). This
indicates that the characteristics of the first hire, and
their relationship to the entrepreneur, may moderate
the entrepreneur’s ‘‘illusory superiority’’ regarding the
first hire. Another consideration to be borne in mind is
that the phenomenon of illusory superiority may no
longer hold when the hiring team consists of more than
one individual, because of other social psychological
phenomena such as focalism and group diffuseness
may play a role and even neutralize any egocentric
‘‘illusory superiority’’ effect (Krizan and Suls 2008).
Furthermore, entrepreneurs will differ in their degree
of overconfidence (Forbes 2005). In addition, there
may be unobserved variables, e.g. relating to the
characteristics and traits of the entrepreneur and the
employee, that might have an influence.
Other possible limitations concern our empirical
methodology. The complexities of the timing and
circumstances of the first hire led us to narrow down
on a methodological set-up with strict conditions—we
distinguished between those who hired one individual
2 years after founding, and those that hired no one
2 years after founding (see Fig. 1). These strict
conditions could be explored in further work. For
example, discrete time duration models could be
applied to investigate the duration between the
business founding and the first hire. Further work
could also investigate the characteristics of entrepre-
neurs (and their employees) where the hire occurred
after more than 2 years, or in cases where two or more
employees were hired instead of just one.
Overall, we have sought to respond to repeated calls
for an improved understanding into the characteristics
and determinants of firm growth (Gilbert et al. 2006;
Coad 2009; McKelvie and Wiklund 2010) by suggest-
ing that a better understanding of the growth of new
ventures can be achieved by focusing on the ‘‘micro-
foundations’’ of growth. In particular, we focus on the
first hire made by solo self-employed entrepreneurs,
which corresponds to the first and perhaps the biggest
growth hurdle a growing firm will face. A detailed
analysis of other ‘‘trigger points’’ (Brown andMawson
2013) in the growth process, such as the discrete events
of opening a new plant, diversifying into an unknown
market or entering a new export market, might also
provide valuable insights into the complexities of firm
growth and the potential benefits for the entrepreneurs,
the employees and the society.
6 Conclusion
We investigated the phenomenon of the first hire using
a rich dataset on new Danish businesses and tracked
the performance over time of entrepreneurs who hire
one employee (compared to those who do not).
Entrepreneurs making their first hire enjoyed higher
sales growth in the previous year, suggesting that sales
growth precedes employment growth in these new
businesses. This suggests that not all new businesses
should seek to hire, but only those new businesses that
have sufficient growth in sales to justify the need for
new employees. New businesses that aggressively
seek to expand by hiring new employees, without first
experiencing an increase in sales, may therefore run
into difficulties. Our results therefore shed light on
how ambitious new businesses should embark on
growth trajectories.
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Regressions shed light on the characteristics of the
entrepreneurs and individuals who participate in the
first hire decision. Entrepreneurs who hire are more
educated and were employed before founding the new
business (hence, are not ‘‘necessity entrepreneurs’’).
Individuals hired into these businesses are relatively
marginalized on labour markets, which underscores
that the jobs created by new businesses play an
important social role in providing jobs to neglected
strata in society.
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Appendix: Summary statistics and correlations
See Fig. 3 and Tables 6, 7, 8 and 9.
Fig. 3 Boxplots where the variables are log-transformed; i.e. boxplots for the evolution of ln(sales) (left) and ln(profits) (right), for the
6 years since start-up, for treatment (1) and control (0)
Table 6 Summary
statistics (the treatment and
control group)
Variable Obs. Mean SD
Sales 32,502 615,768.000 3,462,816.000
Profits 28,473 243,159.700 1,443,957.000
Female 33,297 0.246 0.431
Age 33,297 38.931 10.425
Non-Danish 33,292 0.091 0.287
Married 33,284 0.556 0.497
College degree 33,297 0.125 0.331
Unemployed 33,297 0.083 0.276
Outside labour force 33,297 0.044 0.206
In education 33,297 0.009 0.094
Previous income 32,930 250,432.500 243,923.000
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Table 7 Summary
statistics (treatment only)
Variable Obs. Mean SD
Sales 2190 575,980.800 1,331,654.000
Profits 2037 128,622.000 283,531.000
Female 2215 0.222 0.416
Age 2215 36.372 9.190
Non-Danish 2215 0.120 0.325
Married 2215 0.537 0.499
College degree 2215 0.104 0.305
Unemployed 2215 0.074 0.261
Outside labour force 2215 0.041 0.197
In education 2215 0.013 0.114
Previous income 2184 238,810.200 210,415.700
Household wealth 2184 1,066,746.000 1,750,326.000
Entrepreneurship parents 2215 0.369 0.483
Hires family members 2215 0.283 0.451
Table 8 Summary
statistics (controls only)
Variable Obs. Mean SD
Sales 30,312 618642.600 3,567,811.000
Profits 26,436 251,985.300 1,496,127.000
Female 31,082 0.248 0.432
Age 31,082 39.113 10.484
Non-Danish 31,077 0.089 0.284
Married 31,069 0.558 0.497
College degree 31,082 0.127 0.333
Unemployed 31,082 0.084 0.277
Outside labour force 31,082 0.045 0.206
In education 31,082 0.009 0.092
Previous income 30,746 251,258.100 246,111.800
Household wealth 30,747 1,535,346.000 4,287,112.000
Entrepreneurship parents 31,082 0.351 0.477
Table 6 continued Variable Obs. Mean SD
Household wealth 32,931 1,504,268.000 4,168,580.000
Entrepreneurship parents 33,297 0.353 0.478
Hires family members 2215 0.283 0.451
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